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Hybrid terrestrial-satellite (HTS) communication systems have gained a tremendous amount of interest recently due to the high
demand for global high data rates. Conventional satellite communications operate in the conventional Ku (12 GHz) and Ka (26.5-40
GHz) radio-frequency bands for assessing the feeder link, between the ground gateway and the satellite. Nevertheless, with the
aim to provide hundreds of Mbps of throughput per each user, free-space optical (FSO) feeder links have been proposed to fulfill
these high data rates requirements. In this paper, we investigate the physical layer security performance for a hybrid very high
throughput satellite communication system with an FSO feeder link. In particular, the satellite receives the incoming optical wave
from an appropriate optical ground station, carrying the data symbols of N users through various optical apertures and combines
them using the selection combining technique. Henceforth, the decoded and regenerated information signals of the N users are
zero-forcing (ZF) precoded in order to cancel the interbeam interference at the end-users. The communication is performed under
the presence of malicious eavesdroppers nodes at both hops. Statistical properties of the signal-to-noise ratio of the legitimate and
wiretap links at each hop are derived, based on which the intercept probability metric is evaluated. The derived results show that
above a certain number of optical apertures, the secrecy level is not improved further. Also, the system’s secrecy is improved using
ZF precoding compared to the no-precoding scenario for some specific nodes’ positions. All the derived analytical expressions are
validated through Monte Carlo simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
THROUGHOUT the last few years, satellite communica-tion (SatCom) has been a tremendously evolving segment
of the wireless communication industry, due to the increasing
global demand on broadband satellite communication links
[1]. Interestingly, with the arrival of the fifth-generation (5G)
wireless cellular network, a variety of satellite operators on
the globe are developing broadband communications to com-
plement and compete with the terrestrial cellular networks [2].
In this regard, multibeam SatCom has been widely advocated
as an appropriate way to assess very high-speed satellite-
users link, in which a large number of spot beams is used.
Satellite links aim at providing high-speed communications
(order of hundreds of Mbps per user) to users in areas where
the traditional terrestrial networks offer very low quality of
service [3].
Among the critical challenges faced by the satellite com-
munication industry is the spectrum scarcity issue [3], [4].
For instance, with the high bandwidth requirement of the end-
users, neither the Ku-band (12 GHz) nor the Ka-band (26.5-
40 GHz) seems to fulfill the hundreds of Gbps aggregate
user link throughput, due to the scarce frequency resources in
these bands [5]. In addition to this, multiple ground stations
(gateways) are needed to feed the satellite to assess the desired
data rates while operating on such bands, which results in
significant energy consumption [3].
To this end, free-space optics (FSO) technology has been
broadly endorsed as an effective solution for providing very
high data rate links on terrestrial-satellite communications [6].
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The overarching idea is to carry on data from the optical
ground station (OGS) in the form of conical light beams using
a powered laser device, operating either on the visible (400-
800 nm) or infrared (1500-1550 nm) spectrum, to a satellite,
which converts the optical signal to an electrical one, and
serves the end-users through radio-frequency (RF) spot beams
[4]. From another front, the use of optical bands does not
require any regulation or license fees as done in traditional
Ku and Ka bands, where the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) regulates their use. Also, besides its immunity to
interference and high security, FSO communication can pro-
vide a data rate in the order of Tbps per optical beam, which
renders it a viable alternative solution to reach the desired
high data rates [6]. On the other hand, optical communication
is highly affected by atmospheric and weather losses along the
propagation path, known as turbulence. Pointing error due to
transmitter/receiver misalignment, as well as free-space path-
loss are two other limiting factors of FSO in outdoor com-
munications [7]. Furthermore, another restricting phenomenon
in ground-to-satellite FSO links is cloud coverage. Indeed,
optical communication between the gateway and the satellite
is blocked totally in the presence of clouds [4].
During the last decade, several works and researches have
been conducted onto the deployments of hybrid terrestrial-
satellite (HTS) systems with an optical feeder link. In [4],
the performance analysis of optical feeder link with gateway
diversity, in the presence of stochastic cloud coverage model,
is assessed. Furthermore, the authors in [2] carried out a
performance analysis of an HTS system with an optical feeder
link, with zero-forcing (ZF) precoding to remove the interbeam
interference (IBI), as well as amplification at the satellite are
considered. In addition to this, from an industrial perspective,
several broadband optical feeder-based HTS systems have
been demonstrated in the last few years. For instance, the
first successful ground-to-satellite optical link was performed
between the earth and ETS-VI satellite in Konegi, Japan [8].
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2Besides this, other HTS systems experiments demonstrated
the achievability of great throughput records, such as NASA’s
622 Mbps Laser communication experiments in 2014 [9],
and DLR’s Institute of Communications and Navigation HTS
experiments with a record data rate of 1.72 Tbit/s in 2016, and
13.16 Tbit/s in 2017 [10]. NICT is planning in 2021 to launch
a new test satellite with an aim to demonstrate a 10 Gbps
speed on uplink and downlink of aggregate throughputs [11].
Moreover, in [12], [13], an overview of implementation, per-
formance, technological aspects, and users’ quality of service
on HTS systems with an optical feeder is assessed.
From another front, privacy and security are becoming a
big concern in such networks where considerable attention
from the research community has been paid. Importantly, the
broadcast nature of the wireless RF link renders it vulnerable
to eavesdropping attacks [14]. While higher layers view the
security aspect as an implementation of cryptographic proto-
cols, the physical layer (PHY) security, introduced by Wyner,
aims at establishing secure transmissions, by ensuring that the
data rate of the legitimate link exceeds that of the wiretap one
by a certain threshold.
From a multibeam satellite communication point of view,
the legitimate users-links are established through narrow mul-
tiple spot beams, where each beam targets a single cell on the
covered zone, rendering the communication most unlikely to
being intercepted from distant malicious nodes. Nevertheless,
potential eavesdroppers might be located in the same zone as
the legitimate users, and consequently, the secrecy level of the
user link is affected. To this end, several works in the literature
have dealt with the secrecy level of HTS systems as in [15]–
[17], where the analysis carried out the performance of HTS
relay-based networks, where the feeder link operates on RF
spectrum. On the other hand, several works such as [18], [19]
assessed the PHY security of FSO links.
A. Motivation and Contributions
Very few works in the literature have investigated the
secrecy level of HTS systems with optical feeder link. In
particular, the authors in [20] dealt with the secrecy analysis
of an HTS relay network, where the optical link is used at
the terrestrial side as a last-mile link. Also, the wiretapper is
considered only on the RF side. Distinctively, contributions
such as [21]–[23] dealt with the secrecy level of mixed RF-
FSO links where the RF link is considered in the first hop.
Furthermore, nodes parameters, a data precoding process, and
an eavesdropper on the optical link were not considered in
such works. Besides, differently from the works [24], [25]
where the authors proposed a transmit Laser selection diversity
techniques for FSO systems, the statistics of the combined
SNR using receive diversity selection combining (SC) scheme
were not carried out in closed-form expression. Capitalizing on
this, we aim at this work to investigate the PHY layer security
of an HTS multi-user relay-based system with an optical
feeder link, where the satellite, acting as a relay, converts
the incoming optical wave carrying the users’ data, after
combining the incoming beams to its photodetectors through
SC scheme, to an electrical signal, regenerate and conveys
them to the end-users. Two scenarios are analyzed, namely, i)
the satellite performs ZF precoding technique, after decoding
information signals on the second hop, before transmitting it to
the end-users, ii) the satellite does not perform ZF technique
and delivers the processed received signal to the end-users.
Malicious eavesdroppers are considered on each hop of the
transmission. The main contributions of this paper can be
summarized as follows:
• Statistical properties of the end-to-end secrecy capacity
are retrieved, in terms of legitimate and wiretap instanta-
neous SNRs of the S-R and R-D hops.
• A novel expression for the IP of dual-hop DF relaying-
based systems is retrieved, where a decoding failure event
at the satellite is considered.
• Capitalizing on the above two results, a closed-form
expression of the intercept probability (IP) of the system
is derived for the ZF and non-ZF scenarios.
• An asymptotic analysis of the derived analytical result
is performed based on which the achievable coding gain
and diversity order are quantified.
B. Organization of the Paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II is dedicated to present the system and channel model.
Section III deals with the statistical properties of the end-
to-end SNRs, while Section IV depicts the derived analytical
expression of the IP. In Section V, illustrative numerical results
are shown to assess the effect of channel parameters on the
system’s secrecy level. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODEL
We consider in this analysis a single OGS communicating
with a GEO satellite through an optical feeder link. The
transmit OGS, acting a source (S) node, is assumed to have
a clear line of sight (LOS) link with the satellite unblocked
by clouds. The selected source node transmits data symbols
of the N users through a turbulent optical channel to the
satellite. This latter, acting as a relay (R), combines through
K optical photodetectors the incoming optical wave, converts
it to the electrical domain, performs SC technique, decodes,
and delivers it in the form of N beams to N user earth stations
(Ti)1≤i≤N . If the received SNR at the satellite is greater than
a predefined decoding threshold, it can successfully decode
the information signal. Otherwise, the decoding cannot be
ensured correctly. For the former case, the satellite can either
forward the regenerated signals directly or precode them using
ZF technique. We assume that an eavesdropper attempting to
overhear the divergent optical beam coming from the OGS
to the satellite (FSO S-R hop). In addition to this, another
potential wiretapper attempts to overhear the signal carried to
the earth-station Ti.
A. S-R Link
1) Legitimate Link
An OGS with a LOS unblocked by clouds is considered for
data transmission. Without loss of generality, all users’ signals
are assumed to have the same power.
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The received beam at the satellite contains N multiplexed
signals transmitted from the transmit gateway. Hence, the
received electrical signal vector at the satellite’s k-th aperture,
after demultiplexing, is expressed as [26]
y
(k)
1 =
√
ωlPS (ηIk)
r
2 u+ nk, k = 1, . . . ,K, (1)
with Ik = I
(a)
k I
(p)
k I
(`)
k , being the product of the irradiance
fluctuation due to atmospheric turbulence, the pointing error
due to the beam misalignment, and the free-space path loss,
respectively, with I(`)k = Ite
−φd, and It, d, and φ denote the
laser emittance, the station-satellite distance, and the path loss
exponent, respectively. r ∈ {1, 2} being a detection-technique
dependent parameter, with r = 1 referring to coherent de-
tection, and r = 2 stands for direct detection, and ωl denotes
the portion of power received by the satellite’s photodetectors,
among the total radiated power from the selected OGS. Also:
• u = [u1, u2, . . . , uN ]T denotes the transmitted signal
vector of N signals, with the superscript T refering
to the transpose of a vector. Each unit-power signal
is modulated onto one of the N optical sub-carriers,
where E
[
uHu
]
= N, with E [.] denoting the expectation
operator.
• PS is the OGS transmit power.
• nk = [n
(1)
k , n
(2)
k , . . . , n
(N)
k ]
T stands for the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) process at the satellite with zero
mean and the same variance σ21 .
The satellite converts the received optical waves at the K
apertures into electrical signals, and then uses SC to choose the
branch with highest instantaneous SNR as: s∗ = arg max
1≤k≤K
γ
(k)
1 ,
with γ(k)1 =
PSωl(ηIk)
r
σ21
denoting the instantaneous signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) received at the k-th satellite’s aperture.
Consequently, the combined SNR at the satellite is: γ1 =
max
1≤k≤K
γ
(k)
1 . Afterwards, the satellite performs a decoding
process on the combined electrical signal to regenerate the
information signal again.
2) Wiretap Link
The hybrid ground-satellite communication is performed
under the malicious attempt of eavesdroppers per each one
of the two hops to intercept the legitimate message. For the
FSO link, we consider the presence of one wiretapper e(1)
located at some altitude within the divergence region of the
OGS beam, being able to capture a portion ωe = 1 − ωl
of the optical power. That is, the received SNR at e(1) is
γ
(e)
1 =
ωePS(ηIe(1))
r
σ2
e(1)
, with Ie(1) and σ2e(1) denote the respective
optical channel gain, and the variance of the AWGN at e(1),
respectively.
In terrestrial FSO communication, the altitude-dependent
refractive index structure parameter C2n,$(h) ($ ∈ {1, e}) as
well as the Rytov variance σ2R,$ are two crucial parameters
that represent the atmospheric turbulence and pointing error
loss impairments. Such parameters are expressed in key system
and environment quantities. In the context of vertical optical
links in HTS systems, the altitude-dependent refractive struc-
ture index parameter in m−
2
3 and the Rytov variance can be
expressed for the uplink using the Hufnagel-Valley Boundary
model as given in [27, Eqs. (4, 9-10)], in terms of the altitude
h in meters, the wind speed Vw in m/s, the satellite and
OGS altitudes d$ and h0, the satellite’s zenith angle with
respect to the OGS, and the operating wavelength λ.
Interestingly, ξ2$ =
Weq
2σ2s
denotes the pointing error strength,
which is the ratio between the equivalent beam waist at the
satellite altitude and the beam wander displacement variance,
where the last-mentioned quantities are defined in [28], [29,
Eq. (2)], and [30, Eq. (8)].
B. R-D Link
The satellite generates N adjacent beams. The received
signal vector at the N legitimate end-users and wiretap nodes
can be formulated as
y
(κ)
2 = H
(κ)x+ nκ , (2)
4with κ equals either l for the legitimate earth stations or e(2)
for the second hop’s wiretappers, PSAT is the satellite transmit
power, H(κ) is the channel matrix between the N satellite
antennas and the nodes [κi]i=1,..,N 1, and nκ =
[
n
(i)
κ
]
i=1,..,N
is the AWGN vector whose elements are zero mean and with
the same variance σ2κ .
It is known that the channel matrix H(κ) can be decomposed
as [2]
H(κ) = D(κ)V(κ), (3)
with D(κ) being a diagonal matrix containing real-valued
random fading coefficients, and V(κ) entries are path-
loss and radiation pattern coefficients, defined by V (κ)i,j =
c
√
G
(j)
T G
(κi)
R a
(κi)
j
4pifr(κi)
√
κTBW
[2], where c being the light celerity in the
free space, G(j)T and G
(κi)
R are the respective gains of the
satellite’s j-th transmit antenna and the receive antenna of
the node κi, κ is the Boltzmann constant, T is the receiver
noise temperature, f is the operating frequency, r(κi) is the
distance between the satellite and the node κi, and a(κi)j is
the normalized beam radiation gain, which can be approx-
imated as a(κi)j ≈
(
J1
(
ϑ
(κi)
j
)
2ϑ
(κi)
j
+ 36
J3
(
ϑ
(κi)
j
)
(
ϑ
(κi)
j
)3
)2
[17], with
ϑ
(xi)
j = 2.07123
sin
(
φ
(κi)
j
)
φj,3dB
, and Jn(.) denotes the n-th order
Bessel function of the first kind [31, Eq. (8.402)], and φ(κi)j
denote the angle between the node κi and the j-th beam
boresight as indicated in (2), given as
φ
(κi)
j =
{
φ (i− j) + φ(κj)j , j ≥ i
φ (i− j)− φ(κj)j , j < i
, (4)
with φ = Dr referring to the beam width angle, with D being
the cells’ diameter assumed to be equal for all cells, and r is
the distance between each node κi and the satellite, assumed
to be equal for all nodes (i.e., r(κi) ≈ r, ∀i ≤ N). Also, φj,3dB
denotes the angle corresponding to 3dB power loss of the j-th
beam.
1) With ZF Precoding
a) Legitimate Link: We consider the case of a ZF receiver
employed in [2], where the transmit signals are precoded,
after decoding, at the satellite before transmitting them to
the end-users. Thus, the transmit vector x is expressed as:
x = Mu, where M =
√
ϕA is a N × N precoding matrix
with A=
(
V(l)
)−1
, and
ϕ =
PSAT
N Tr
[(
V(l)
(
V(l)
)H)−1] , (5)
where the superscript H refers to the Hermitian operator
defined as the conjugate of the transpose matrix, and Tr[.]
stands for the matrix’s trace.
1The subscripts/superscripts ”l” and ”e(2)” are used to denote the legiti-
mate and wiretap links at the second hop, respectively.
After performing ZF precoding at the satellite, the received
signal and SNR at the i-th earth-station, without considering
the first hop, can be formulated as follows
y
(li)
ZF =
√
ϕD
(l)
i ui + n
(li), (6)
γ
(li)
ZF = γ
(li)
ZF
∣∣∣D(l)i ∣∣∣2 , (7)
with D(κ)i denoting the i-th element of the diagonal of D
(κ),
and γ(li)ZF =
ϕ
σ2l
. Since the satellite performs DF protocol, the
equivalent received SNR at the i-th earth-station is given as
γ
(li)
eq,ZF = min
(
γ1, γ
(li)
ZF
)
. (8)
b) Wiretap Link: As far as the second hop is concerned,
the satellite-stations links are ensured under the potential pres-
ence of one eavesdropper
(
e
(2)
i
)
1≤i≤N
per each cell i, aiming
to intercept the RF beam transmitted to it. The received signal
and instantaneous SNR at e(2)i can be expressed, respectively,
as follows
y
e
(2)
i ,ZF
=
√
ϕD
(e(2))
i
N∑
l=1
ul
N∑
j=1
V
(e(2))
i,j Aj,l + n
(e
(2)
i ), (9)
γ
e
(2)
i ,ZF
=
ψiγ
(
e
(2)
i
)
ZF
θiγ
(
e
(2)
i
)
ZF + 1
, (10)
where n(e
(2)
i ) denotes an AWGN process at e(2)i with
zero mean and the same variance for all wiretap nodes
σ2
e(2)
, γ
(
e
(2)
i
)
ZF = γ
(ei)
ZF
∣∣∣∣D(e(2))i ∣∣∣∣2 , γ
(
e
(2)
i
)
ZF =
ϕ
σ2
e(2)
, ψi =(
N∑
j=1
V
(e(2))
i,j Aj,i
)2
, and θi =
(
N∑
m=1,m 6=i
N∑
j=1
V
(e(2))
i,j Aj,m
)2
.
2) Without ZF Precoding
When no ZF precoding is performed at the transmit OGS,
the received signal and SNR at the legitimate earth station li
as well as the eavesdropper e(2)i are given as
2
y
(κi)
NZF =
√
PSAT
N
D
(κ)
i
N∑
j=1
V
(κ)
i,j uj + n
(κi), (11)
γκi,NZF =
Ψ(κi)γ(κi)NZF
Θ(κi)γ(κi)NZF + 1
, (12)
with γ(κi)NZF = γ
(κi)
NZF
∣∣∣D(κ)i ∣∣∣2 , γ(κi)NZF = PSATNσ2κ , Ψ(κi) =(
V
(κ)
i,i
)2
, and Θ(κi) =
(
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
V
(κ)
i,j
)2
.
III. STATISTICAL PROPERTIES
In this section, the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of the SNR of the legitimate link both hops, as well as the
wiretap link, is expressed in terms of the system and channel
parameters.
2The subscript ”NZF” is used to denote the "non-ZF case", while the
”ZF” subscript denotes the ZF adoption scenario.
5A. S-R Link
The Gamma-Gamma distribution is considered for modeling
the atmospheric turbulence induced-fading with pointing error
for each received optical beam. The respective probability
density function (PDF) and CDF of the SNRs γ(k)1 and γ
(e)
1 ,
received respectively at the satellite’s k-th aperture and the
received one at E1, are given as [7]
f
γ
($)
1
(z) =
P$
rz
G3,01,3
Υ$ ( z
µ
($)
r
) 1
r ∣∣∣∣ −; ξ2$ + 1ξ2$, α$, β$;−
 ,
(13)
F
γ
($)
1
(z) =
(2pi)
1−r P$
r2−α$−β$
G3r,1r+1,3r+1
(
Υr$z
r2rµ
($)
r
∣∣∣∣∣ 1;κ($)1κ($)2 ; 0
)
,
(14)
respectively, with Υ$ =
ξ2$α$β$
ξ2$+1
, $ ∈ {k, e}, P$ =
ξ2$
Γ(α$)Γ(β$)
, µ
($)
r = E
[
γ
($)
1
]
, κ($)1 =
(
ξ2$+i
r
)
i=1,..,r
,
κ
($)
2 =
(
ξ2$+i
r ,
α$+i
r ,
β$+i
r
)
i=0,..,r−1
, and Gm,np,q (. |. ) refers
to the Meijer’s G-function [32, Eqs. (1.111), (1.112)]. More-
over, the turbulence-induced fading parameters α$ and β $
are expressed terms of the Rytov variance σ2R,$ given in
[27, Eqs. (4, 9-10)] using [33, Eqs. (9-10)]. Without loss of
generality, we consider that the fading amplitudes are i.i.d on
all branches, that is αk = α1, βk = β1, µ
(k)
1 = µ1, ξk = ξ1
for k = 1, ..,K.
Proposition 1. The CDF of the combined SNR at the satellite
can be expressed as follows
Fγ1(z) = PK1
∑
h1+h2+h3=K
∞∑
l=0
Fh1,h2,h3,l
(Υz)
−%l,h1,h2,h3 , (15)
with Fh1,h2,h3,l = K!h1!h2!h3!
(
a
(1)
0
)h1 ∑
q2+q3=l
c
(2)
q2 c
(3)
q3 , a
(1)
0 =
Γ(α1−ξ21)Γ(β1−ξ21)
ξ21
, Υ = ξ
2
1α1β1
µ1(ξ21+1)
, %l,h1,h2,h3 = l + h1ξ
2
1 +
h2α1 + h3β1,
c(i)m =

(
a
(i)
0
)hi
,m = 0
1
ma0
m∑
j=1
(jhi −m+ j) a(i)j c(i)m−j ;m ≥ 1
, (16)
and a(2)l =
(−1)lΓ(β1−α1−l)
l!(ξ21−α1−l)(l+α1)
, a
(3)
l =
(−1)lΓ(α1−β1−l)
l!(ξ21−β1−l)(l+β1)
.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A.
B. R-D Link
1) With ZF Precoding
On the other hand, shadowed-Rician fading channel is
considered for the satellite RF links, where the PDF of the
SNR γ(κi)ZF can be calculated by applying Jacobi transform on
the fading envelope PDF given in [34] as follows
f
γ
(κi)
ZF
(z) =
λκi
γ
(κi)
ZF
e
− ρκi z
γ
(κi)
ZF 1F1
(
m(κi)s ; 1;
δκiz
γ
(κi)
ZF
)
, (17)
with 1F1(.; .; .) denoting the confluent hypergeometric func-
tion [31, Eq. (9.210)], and
λκi =
1
2bκi
(
2bκim
(κi)
s
2bκim
(κi)
s +Ω
(κi)
s
)m(κi)s
, ρκi =
1
2bκi
, δκi =
Ω
(κi)
s
2bκi
(
2bm
(κi)
s +Ω
(κi)
s
) . Also, Ω(κi)s , 2bκi , and m(κi)s stand for
the average power of LOS and multipath components, and the
fading severity parameter, respectively.
Consequently, by representing the hypergeometric function
1F1 (.; .; .) through the finite series [35, Eq. (9)] for integer
parameter values, and using [31, Eq. (3.351.1)], the respective
CDF is expressed as
F
γ
(κi)
ZF
(z) = λκi
m
(κi)
s −1∑
n=0
(
m
(κi)
s − 1
n
)
δnκi
vn+1κi n!
γinc
(
n+ 1,
vκiz
γ
(κi)
ZF
)
,
(18)
where γinc (., .) stands for the lower incomplete Gamma func-
tion [31, Eq. (8.350.1)], with vκi = ρκi − δκi . Furthermore,
the CDF and PDF of the end-to-end SINR in (10) at e(2)i are
expressed as
Fγ
e
(2)
i
,ZF
(z) =
 Fγ(e(2)i )ZF
(
z
ψi−θiz
)
; z < Li
1; z ≥ Li
,
fγ
e
(2)
i
,ZF
(z) =
 ψi(ψi−θiz)2
∂F
γ
(e(2)i )
ZF
(
z
ψi−θiz
)
∂z ; z < Li
0; z ≥ Li
.
(19)
with Li = ψiθi .
2) Without ZF Precoding
Importantly, when no ZF precoding is performed, the CDF
of the received SNR at node κi, given in (12), can be expressed
as
Fγκi,NZF (z) = Pr
[
γ
(κi)
NZF
(
Ψ(κi) −Θ(κi)z
)
< z
]
, (20)
where two cases are distinguished, namely z < L(κi) and
z ≥ L(κi), with L(κi) = Ψ(κi)
Θ(κi)
. Similarly to the ZF precoding
case, the CDF and PDF of the received SNR at node κi are
given as
Fγκi,NZF (z) =
{
F
γ
(κi)
NZF
(
z
Ψ(κi)−Θ(κi)z
)
; z < L(κi)
1; z ≥ L(κi)
,
fγκi,NZF (z) =
 Ψ
(κi)
(Ψ(κi)−Θ(κi)z)2
∂F
γ
(κi)
NZF
(
z
Ψ(κi)−Θ(κi)z
)
∂z
; z < L(κi)
0; z ≥ L(κi)
.
(21)
with F
γ
(κi)
NZF
(.) is obtained from (18) by replacing γ(κi)ZF with
γ
(κi)
NZF .
IV. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The intercept probability metric is defined as the probability
that the secrecy capacity, which is the difference between
the capacity of the legitimate links and that of the wiretap
channels (i.e., {S-R, S-e(1)}, {R-li, R-e(2)i }), equals to zero.
Additionally, from [36, Eq. (26)] and [37], the respective
6channel capacities of the FSO legitimate and wiretap links
are given for coherent detection techniques as
C% = log2 (1 + Y%) , (22)
with (%, Y%) equals either (1, γ1) or
(
e(1), γ
(e)
1
)
.
On the other hand, the system’s intercept probability is
defined as
P
(i)
int,Ξ = Pr
(
C
(i)
s,Ξ = 0
)
= Pr
(
C
(i)
s,Ξ = 0
∣∣∣ γ1 > γth)Pr (γ1 > γth)
+ Pr
(
C
(i)
s,Ξ = 0
∣∣∣ γ1 < γth)Pr (γ1 < γth) , (23)
where γth is a decoding threshold SNR, below which the
decoding process fails, Ξ ∈ { ZF,NZF}, and
C
(i)
s,Ξ = min
(
C(1)s , C
(2,i)
s,eq,Ξ
)
, (24)
with
C(1)s = log2
(
1 + γ1
1 + γ
(e)
1
)
, (25)
and
C
(2,i)
s,eq,Ξ = min
(
C
(1,2,i)
s,Ξ , C
(2,i)
s,Ξ
)
, (26)
stand for the end-to-end, first hop, and second hops’ secrecy
capacities, respectively, considering DF relaying protocol, with
C
(1,2,i)
s,Ξ = log2
(
1 + γ1
1 + γ
e
(2)
i ,Ξ
)
, (27)
C
(2,i)
s,Ξ = log2
(
1 + γli,Ξ
1 + γ
e
(2)
i ,Ξ
)
. (28)
Therefore, the overall secrecy capacity in (24) can be
expressed as
C
(i)
s,Ξ = min
(
C(1)s , C
(2,i)
s,Ξ , C
(1,2,i)
s,Ξ
)
. (29)
Lemma 1. The system’s intercept probability for DF relaying
scheme is given as
P
(i)
int,Ξ = 1−
∫ ∞
y=γth
fγ1 (y)Fγ(e)1
(y)JΞ(y)dy, (30)
where JΞ(y) =
∫ y
z=0
fγ
e
(2)
i
,Ξ
(z)F cγli,Ξ
(z) dz, with F c. (.)
accounts for the complementary CDF 3.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix B.
3Both notations γli,ZF and γ
(li)
ZF stand for the same random variable.
A. Exact Analysis
Lemma 2. The integral JΞ(y) in the expression (30) is given
for the ZF and NZF cases as
JZF (y) =
m
(li)
s −1∑
n1=0
m
(e(2)i )
s −1∑
n2=0
Ui (n1, n2)
exp
(
r
(
e
(2)
i
)
1
) n1∑
k1=0
∞∑
j=0
(−1)j
j!k1!
×
(
ψir
(li)
1 r
(
e
(2)
i
)
1
)j+k1 k1+n2+j∑
p=0
(
k1+n2+j
p
)(
−r
(
e
(2)
i
)
1
)p−n2
×

θir
(
e
(2)
i
)
1 Γ
(
p+ 1− k1 − j, r
(
e
(2)
i
)
1
)
−Γ
(
p+ 1− k1 − j, r
(e(2)i )
1 ψi
ψi−θiy
)
 ,
(31)
and in (32) at the top of the next page for y < si, with si
equals Li or L
(
e
(2)
i
)
for the ZF and NZF cases, respectively,
r
(κi)
1 =
vκi
γ
(κi)
2,ZF θi
, G(ai,bi) = vaiΨ
(b)
i
Tiγ(ai)2,NZF
,
(
a, b ∈ {l, e(2)}) , Ti =
Ψ
(
e
(2)
i
)
Θ(li) − Ψ(li)Θ
(
e
(2)
i
)
, Γ (., .) is the upper-incomplete
Gamma function [31, Eq. (8.350.2)], and
Ui (n1, n2) =
λliλe(2)
i
n2!
(
m
(li)
s − 1
n1
)(
m
(
e
(2)
i
)
s − 1
n2
)
δ
n1
li
v
n1+1
li
δ
n2
e
(2)
i
v
n2+1
e
(2)
i
.
Remark 1. It is noteworthy that the system’s IP will be
computed for the ZF precoding scenario for two cases, namely
Li < γth and Li ≥ γth, while for the non-ZF scenario, the
IP expression is limited only to the case when L
(
e
(2)
i
)
< γth,
due to the toughness of the encountered mathematical compu-
tation.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix C.
Lemma 3. The integral K (ϕ) =
∫∞
y=ϕ
fγ1 (y)Fγ(e)1
dy can be
expressed as follows
K (ϕ) = 1− Fγ1 (ϕ)Fγ(e)1 (ϕ)−H1 +H2 (ϕ) , (33)
with
H1 = ξ
2
e
P−K1
∑
h1+h2+h3=K
∞∑
l=0
Fh1,h2,h3,l
(αe)%l,h1,h2,h3
(βe)%l,h1,h2,h3
(ξ2e + %l,h1,h2,h3) Υ
%l,h1,h2,h3
e
,
(34)
H2 (ϕ) = PK1 Pe
∑
h1+h2+h3=K
∞∑
l=0
%l,h1,h2,h3Fh1,h2,h3,l
ϕ−%l,h1,h2,h3
×G3,23,5
(
Υeϕ
∣∣∣∣ 1− %l,h1,h2,h3 , 1; ξ2e + 1ξ2e , αe, βe; 0,−%l,h1,h2,h3
)
, (35)
where (.). stands for the Pochhammer symbol [38, Eq.
(06.10.02.0001.01)], and Υe =
ξ2eαeβe
µ
(e)
1 (ξ
2
e+1)
.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix D.
Proposition 2. The system’s IP closed-form expression is
given in (36) at the top of the next page, as well as
7JNZF (y) =

m
(li)
s −1∑
n1=0
m
(e(2)i )
s −1∑
n2=0
Ui(n1,n2)
exp
(
−G(li,e
(2)
i )
) ∞∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
G(e
(2)
i
,li)
)j+n2+1
k1!j!
n2+k1+j∑
p=0
(n2+k1+jp )(
−G(li,e
(2)
i )
)p−k1−j−n2−1
×
 Γ
(
p− n2 − 1− j,G
(
li,e
(2)
i
))
−Γ
(
p− n2 − 1− j, G(li,li)TiΘ(li)(Ψ(li)−Θ(li)y) +
G(li,e
(2)
i )Θ(e
(2)
i )
Θ(li)
)
 ,L(li) < L(e(2)i )
m
(li)
s −1∑
n1=0
m
(e(2)i )
s −1∑
n2=0
Ui(n1,n2)
exp
(
G(e
(2)
i
,li)
) n1∑
k1=0
∞∑
j=0
(−1)k1
(
G(li,e
(2)
i )
)j+k1
k1!j!
n2+k1+j∑
p=0
(n2+k1+jp )(
G(e
(2)
i
,li)
)p−n2−j−k1
×
 Γ
(
p− k1 − j + 1,−G
(
e
(2)
i ,li
))
−Γ
(
p− k1 − j + 1,
(
Ti
Ψ(e
(2)
i )−Θ(e
(2)
i )y
−Θ(li)
)
G(e
(2)
i
,e
(2)
i )
Θ(e
(2)
i )
)
 ,L(li) > L(e(2)i )
(32)
P
(i)
int,ZF =

1− JZF (Li)K (γth) ;Li < γth
1−O(i)1 −O(i)2 − JZF (Li)K (Li) ; γth ≤ Li < 2γth
1−O(i)1 −O(i)3 − JZF (Li)K (Li) ;Li > 2γth
, (36)
P
(i)
int,NZF = 1− JNZF
(
min
[
L(li),L
(
e
(2)
i
)])
K (γth) ,
(37)
for L
(
e
(2)
i
)
< γth, with
O(i)1 = JZF (Li) [K (γth)−K (Li)] , (38)
O(i)m+1 =
PK1 Pe
exp
(
−r
(
e
(2)
i
)
1
) ∑
h1+h2+h3=K
∞∑
l=0
Fh1,h2,h3,l%l,h1,h2,h3
×
m
(li)
s −1∑
n1=0
m
(e(2)i )
s −1∑
n2=0
Ui (n1, n2)
n1∑
k1=0
∞∑
j=0
(
r
(li)
1 ψi
)j+k1
j!k1!
×
k1+n2+j∑
p=0
(
k1+n2+j
p
) [B(m,i)1 +B(m,i)αe +B(m,i)βe ](
−r
(
e
(2)
i
)
1
)p−n2−k1−j ;m = 1, 2,
(39)
and
B(m,i)ξ2e =
{ Si (ξ2e , 0) ;m = 1
Ri
(
ξ2e , 0
)
;m = 2
,
B(m,i)x =

∞∑
v=0
Si (x, v) ;m = 1
∞∑
v=0
Ri (x, v) ;m = 2
, x ∈ {αe, βe} ,(40)
with b(0)ξ2e =
Γ(αe−ξ2e)Γ(βe−ξ2e)
ξ2e
, b
(v)
αe =
(−1)vΓ(βe−αe−v)
v!(ξ2e−αe−v)(v+αe) , b
(v)
βe
= (−1)
vΓ(αe−βe−v)
v!(ξ2e−βe−v)(l+βe) ,
C(x, q, v) = (−1)q (g(x, q, v)− 1) q!, g(x, q, v) = 1 + q +
v + x+ %l,h1,h2,h3 ,
Si (y, v) = Υ
y+v
e
L
−C(y,0,v)
i
b(v)x
∞∑
q=0
(
1− Liγth
)q+1
q!
×G4,00,3
 r
(
e
(2)
i
)
1 γth
Li − γth
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Λ1 (y, q, v)
 , (41)
Ri (y, v) = Υ
y+v
e b
(v)
y
L
−C(y,0,v)
i
∞∑
q=0
(
Li
γth
− 1
)−C(y,0,v)−q
C(y, q, v)
×G3,00,2
(
r
(
e
(2)
i
)
1
∣∣∣∣∣Λ2 (y, q, v)
)
− Υ
y+v
e b
(v)
y Γ (C(y, 0, v))
L
−C(αe,0,v)
i
×G2,00,1
(
r
(
e
(2)
i
)
1
∣∣∣∣ −; g(y, 0, v)0,−k1 − j + p+ 1;−
)
, (42)
Λ1 (x, q, v) =
( −; g(x, 0, v), 1, 2 + q
g(x, q, v), 1 + q, 0,−k1 − j + p+ 1;−
)
,
and
Λ2 (x, q, v) =
( −; g(x, 0, v), 1
0,−k1 − j + p+ 1, g(x, q, v);−
)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix E.
B. Asymptotic Analysis
Proposition 3. The system’s IP can be asymptotically ex-
panded at high SNR regime (i.e., γ(li)Ξ , µ1 →∞) as follows
P
(i,∞)
int,Ξ = Gc,Ξ
(
γ
(li)
Ξ
)−Gd
, (43)
8with
Gc,Ξ =

(
a
(d)
0 P1
(

(i)
Ξ Υ
′a(Ξ)
)xd)K
F
γ
(e)
1
(
a(Ξ)
)
+X (a(Ξ)) , if Kxd < 1
Q(i,Ξ), Kxd > 1
, (44)
a(Ξ) =
{
γth, Ξ = NZF or (Ξ = ZF and γth ≥ Li)
Li, Ξ = ZF and γth < Li
,
(45)
Gd = min (1,Kxd) , (46)
where Υ′ = ξ
2
1α1β1
ξ21+1
, 
(i)
Ξ =
γ
(li)
Ξ
µ1
, xd = min
i=1,2,3
(xi) , and
X (ϕ) = Pe
(
a
(d)
0 P1
(

(i)
Ξ Υ
′
)xd)K
×

Γ(αe+Kxd)Γ(βe+Kxd)
Υ
Kxd
e (ξ2e+Kxd)
−ϕKxdG3,12,4
(
Υeϕ
∣∣∣∣ 1−Kxd; ξ2e + 1ξ2e , αe, βe;−Kxd
)  .
(47)
and Q(i,ZF ), Q(i,NZF ) are given in (48) and (49) at the top
of the next page, with Z(i) = vliΨ
(e(2)i )
Ti exp
(
G(e
(2)
i
,li)
) , Ei(.) is the
exponential integral function [31, Eq. (8.211.1)].
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix F.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The derived analytic results, which are validated with their
respective Monte Carlo simulations are depicted in this section
to analyze the performance of the considered set up. Some
illustrative numerical examples are depicted to inspect the
effects of the key system parameters on the overall secrecy
performance of the considered hybrid terrestrial-satellite link.
To this end, the system and channel parameters are set as
detailed in Table I. The FSO hop turbulence parameters were
computed based on OGS-satellite distance, wavelength, and
aperture radius using [27, Eq. (4, 9-10)], [28], [29, Eq. (2)],
and [30, Eq. (8)]. Furthermore, the positions of the legitimate
and wiretap nodes were set using Table I and based on (4)
with φ(lj)j = 3 × 10−3 rad, φ
(
e
(2)
j
)
j = 6.66 × 10−4 rad ,
respectively, except Figs. 7-11, where φ
(
e
(2)
j
)
j = 6.66× 10−4
rad, φ(lj)j = 5 × 10−4 rad. Also, the simulation is performed
by generating 2× 106 random samples.
In Fig. 3, the IP is shown as a function of the average
SNR PSATσ2κ (κ = {l, e
(2)}), by considering PSAT
σ2l
= PSAT
σ2
e(2)
,
for various optical apertures at the satellite. One can ascertain
evidently that the secrecy performance decreases as a function
of PSATσ2κ , particularly below a certain threshold SNR and for
high values of K. However, the secrecy gets steady for higher
average SNR values. Also, the number of optical apertures
at the satellite impacts the secrecy level of the system. The
greater the number of apertures, the higher is the legitimate
link capacity, and consequently, the more secure is the whole
link. Nevertheless, one can note also that above K = 7
apertures, the IP is not improved significantly.
Fig. 4 shows the IP evolution for the ZF case versus PSATσ2κ
for various values of legitimate receiver antenna gains. One
can remark that for increasing the antennas gains of the
legitimate users can ensure a significant improvement of the
received legitimate SNR, and consequently results in better
secrecy performance of the system.
Fig. 5 depicts the IP for the non-ZF case as a function of
Ω
(li)
s for various values bli , with Ω
(
e
(2)
i
)
s = 3, m
(xi)
s = 2,
b
e
(2)
i
= 1, and PSAT
σ2l
= PSAT
σ2
e(2)
= 40 dB. One can ascertain
that the higher the power of the legitimate link LOS and
multipath components Ω(li)s and bli , the higher the second
hop’s legitimate link SNR, which results in a greater overall
secrecy capacity. Thus, the system’s secrecy gets better.
Fig. 6 shows the IP evolution versus the power portion
received at the satellite ωl, for a fixed transmit power-to-noise
ratio of the second hop PSAT
σ2l
= PSAT
σ2
e(2)
= 40 dB, and PS
σ21
= 50,
60, and 70 dB with PS
σ21
= PS
σ2
e(1)
+ 20 dB. One can notice that
the system’s secrecy improves by increasing the portion of
power received by the legitimate node (i.e., the satellite). In
fact, as ωl is increasing, the SNR of the first hop’s legitimate
link as well as the equivalent end-to-end SNR increase. As
a result, the overall secrecy capacity in (24) gets greater too,
which leads to a decrease in the system’s IP. Nevertheless, at
higher ωl values (higher γ1), the IP gets steady at a certain
level. In fact, from (24), the overall secrecy capacity will be
restricted to the minimum of the two hops’ secrecy capacities
(i.e., C(2,i)s,eq,Ξ), regardless the increase in ωl (i.e., C
(1)
s increase).
Figs. 7 and 8 depict the IP evolution versus PSAT
σ2l
, for the
ZF and the non-ZF precoding scenarios, respectively, for three
different scenarios of the first hop SNRs, namely PS
σ21
= 80
dB, and PS
σ2
e(1)
= 60, 70,and 80 dB. One can remarkably note
that for the both abovementioned scenarios, the IP is improved
with increasing the difference between the FSO legitimate and
wiretapper average SNRs. Nevertheless, the greater the gap,
the lesser the secrecy improvement.
In Fig. 9, the IP is shown versus PSAT
σ2l
for two scenarios:
(i) ZF precoding case, and (ii) non-ZF precoding. We fixed
again PS
σ21
= PS
σ2
e(1)
= 30 dB. Importantly, we depict the
IP for the two abovementioned scenarios, as computed in
the non-ZF scenario in (37), for case 1
(
L(li) < L
(
e
(2)
i
))
and case 2
(
L(li) ≥ L
(
e
(2)
i
))
, based on Table I and (4)
with φ
(
e
(2)
j
)
j = 6.66 × 10−4 rad, φ(lj)j = 5 × 10−4 rad
(i.e., case 1) and φ(lj)j = 3×10−3 rad, φ
(
e
(2)
j
)
j = 6.66×10−4
rad (i.e., case 2), respectively. On the other hand, the two
aforementioned cases were implemented for the ZF precod-
ing expression by adopting the same two abovementioned
scenarios of φ(κi)j . One can ascertain evidently that the ZF
precoding case outperforms its non-ZF counterpart for case 1.
Thus, the closer the legitimate node to the beams boresight
(cells’ centers) compared to the wiretap node, the worse is
the secrecy. Additionally, the non-ZF scenario admits a steady
9Q(i,ZF ) = ψi exp
(
r
(
e
(2)
i
)
1
)
m
(e(2)i )
s −1∑
n2=0
Ui (0, n2)
n2+1∑
p=0
(
n2 + 1
p
)
(−1)n2+1−p
(
r
(
e
(2)
i
)
1
)n2−p+1
Γ
(
p, r
(
e
(2)
i
)
1
)
(48)
Q(i,NZF ) =

Z(i)
m
(e(2)i )
s −1∑
n2=0
Ui(0,n2)(
G(e
(2)
i
,li)
)−n2−1

Ei
(
G
(
e
(2)
i ,li
))
+
n2+1∑
q=1
(
n2 + 1
q
) γinc(q,−G(e(2)i ,li))(
−Θ(li)Ψ(e
(2)
i )
)−q−n2−1
 ,L(li) < L
(
e
(2)
i
)
−Z(i)
m
(e(2)i )
s −1∑
n2=0
Ui (0, n2) (n2 + 1)!G2,01,2
(
−G
(
e
(2)
i ,li
) ∣∣∣∣ 2 + n20, 1 + n2
)
,L(li) ≥ L
(
e
(2)
i
)
,
(49)
TABLE I: Simulation parameters’ values.
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
f 20 GHz K 3 (Except Fig. 3) N 5
T 193.15 ◦K Rk 50 cm r 6000 km
Bw 50 MHz Re 100 cm Vw 21 m/s
G
(li)
R 40 dBi (except Fig. 4) ωe 0.3 (Except Fig. 6)
PS
σ21
80 dB (Except Fig. 6)
G
(
e
(2)
i
)
R 25 dBi ωl 0.7 (Except Fig. 6)
PS
σ2
e(1)
60 dB (Except Fig. 6)
G
(i)
T 60 dBi m
(κi)
s 2 W0 8 cm
φj,3dB 0.4◦ Ω
(κi)
s 3 (Except Fig. 5) λ 1550 nm
dk = de 6000 Km bκi 1.4 (Except Fig. 5) D 100 Km
h0 25 m A 1.7× 10−14 m− 23 γth 20 dB
IP behavior at high SNR regime regardless of the increase
in PSAT
σ2l
. In fact, from (12), one can notice clearly that at
high γ(κi)NZF values, the received SNRs γκi,NZF reduce to
L(li) and L
(
e
(2)
i
)
, for κ = l, e(2), respectively. Given that
L(li) < L
(
e
(2)
i
)
, it follows that the wiretapper received SNR
is always greater than the legitimate one for high average SNR
values, leading to steady IP performance. On the other hand,
the IP shows a distinguished behavior for the second case(
i.e., φ(li)j ≥ φ
(
e
(2)
i
)
j
)
, where the non-ZF case outperforms
the ZF precoding one. In fact, and similarly to the previous
case, as L(li) ≥ L
(
e
(2)
i
)
, the legitimate SNR is most likely
greater than the wiretapper one. Thus, the farther the legitimate
node from the cells’ center compared to e(2)i , the better the se-
crecy performance. Additionally, due to ZF SNR normalization
in (5) and (7), the ZF precoding average SNR most likely drops
below L(li), resulting in secrecy performance degradation.
Fig. 10 represents the IP evolution versus µ1, when ZF
precoding is performed, for various SNR proportionality val-
ues
(
i.e., µ1 = iγ
(li)
ZF , i =
1
2 , 1, 2
)
, and for eavesdropper
average SNR value PS
σ2
e(1)
= PS
σ2
e(2)
= 30 dB. We can ascertain
that the higher the first hop average SNR (i.e., higher OGS
transmit power or lower satellite reception noise), the better the
overall system’s secrecy. Furthermore, the asymptotic curves
match tightly the exact ones, which proves the accuracy of the
retrieved expressions in high SNR regime.
VI. CONCLUSION
The secrecy performance of a hybrid terrestrial-satellite
communication system, operating with an optical feeder in
the presence of potential wiretappers in both hops is assessed.
Statistical properties of the per-hop SNR of the legitimate, as
well as the wiretap link, are derived. Furthermore, a novel
expression for the IP for a dual-hop DF-based communication
system is retrieved, based on which the analyzed system’s
IP metric is investigated in closed-form and asymptotic ex-
pressions in terms of key system and channel parameters for
several parameters’ values cases. The analysis was performed
for two scenarios, namely by considering ZF precoding at the
satellite, and by assuming direct satellite delivery to the earth-
stations (i.e., non-ZF). The obtained analytical results show
that the system’s secrecy can be significantly improved by
increasing the number of optical photodetectors at the satellite,
gateway and satellite transmit powers, as well as antennas
gains. Furthermore, ZF precoding technique improves the
system’s secrecy level compared to the non-ZF case for some
specific nodes’ positions scenarios.
A potential extension of this work might be the consider-
ation of amplify-and-forward (AF) relaying scheme as well
as investigating the impact of cloud coverage on the overall
secrecy performance.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The SNR γ1 is the maximum among individual SNRs γ
(k)
1
at each of the K photodetectors at the satellite. Consequently,
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Fig. 3: IP versus PSAT
σ2κ
for various K values.
Fig. 4: IP versus PSAT
σ2κ
for various G(li)R values.
its respective CDF can be expressed in the case of i.i.d fading
amplitudes, using (14) for coherent detection (i.e., r = 1) as
Fγ1(z) =
[
P1G3,12,4
(
Υz
∣∣∣∣ 1; ξ21 + 1ξ21 , α1, β1; 0
)]K
, (50)
with Υ is defined in Proposition 1. By making use of the
residues theorem [39, Theorem 1.2] on the Meijer’s G-function
above, one obtains
Fγ1(z) = PK1 [∆1 + ∆2 + ∆3]K , (51)
with
∆i = (Υz)
xi Ei, (52)
and Ei =
∑∞
l=0 a
(i)
l (Υz)
l
, and xi ∈ {ξ21 , α1, β1}.
Using the multinomial theorem, the CDF can be formulated
as
Fγ1(z) = PK1
∑
h1+h2+h3=K
K!
h1!h2!h3!
(Υz)
h1ξ
2
1+h2α1+h3β1
E−h11 E−h22 E−h33
.
(53)
Involving the identity [31, Eq. (0.314)], we have the follow-
ing: Ehii =
∞∑
l=0
c
(i)
l z
lΥl, where the coefficients c(i)l are defined
in Proposition 1. Consequently, we have the following
Eh11 Eh22 Eh33 = c(1)1
∞∑
l=0
 ∑
q2+q3=l
c(2)q2 c
(3)
q3
 zlΥl. (54)
By involving (54) into (53), Proposition 1 is attained.
Fig. 5: IP without ZF precoding versus Ω(li)s
Fig. 6: IP with ZF precoding versus ωl .
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Relying on the probability theory, we have the following
Pr
(
C
(i)
s,Ξ = 0, γ1 > γth
)
= Pr (γ1 > γth)−Pr
(
C
(i)
s,Ξ > 0, γ1 > γth
)
.
(55)
When γ1 < γth, the satellite fails at decoding the informa-
tion message. Therefore, no signal will be transmitted to the
legitimate earth-stations li as well as the eavesdroppers e
(2)
i .
Hence, we have γli,Ξ = γe(2)i ,Ξ
= 0, which yields from (28)
and (29) that C(i)s,Ξ = 0 and Pr
(
C
(i)
s,Ξ = 0
∣∣∣ γ1 < γth) = 1.
As a result, by making use of (55) into (23), the overall IP
expression reduces to
P
(i)
int,Ξ = 1− Pr
(
C
(i)
s,Ξ > 0, γ1 > γth
)
. (56)
By involving (29) into the above equation and relying
on probability theory and some algebraic manipulations, one
obtains
P
(i)
int,Ξ = 1−Pr
(
γ1 > γ
(e)
1 , γ1 > γe(2)i ,Ξ
, γli,Ξ > γe(2)i ,Ξ
, γ1 > γth
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
.
(57)
The above probability I can be expressed as I =
6∑
i=1
Ii,
with Ii are the probabilities associated with the events Ei
shown in Table II.
11
Fig. 7: IP with ZF precoding vs PSAT
σ2
l
.
Fig. 8: IP without ZF precoding vs PSAT
σ2
l
TABLE II: Six possible events for I.
Event Event
E1 γ1 > γ
(e)
1 > γe(2)i ,Ξ
> γth E4 γ1 > γth > γ
(e)
1 > γe(2)i ,Ξ
E2 γ1 > γ
e
(2)
i ,Ξ
> γ
(e)
1 > γth E5 γ1 > γe(2)i ,Ξ
> γth > γ
(e)
1
E3 γ1 > γth > γe(2)i ,Ξ
> γ
(e)
1 E6 γ1 > γ
(e)
1 > γth > γe(2)i ,Ξ
Relying on Table II, one can see that
I1=
∫ ∞
y=γth
F cγ1 (y) fγ(e)1
(y) dy
∫ y
z=γth
fγ
e
(2)
i
,Ξ
(z)F cγli,Ξ
(z) dz,
(58)
I2 =
∫ ∞
z=γth
F cγ1 (z) fγe(2)
i
,Ξ
(z)F cγli,Ξ
(z)
∫ z
y=γth
f
γ
(e)
1
(y) dydz,
(59)
I3 =
∫ ∞
x=γth
∫ γth
y=0
∫ γth
z=y
∫ ∞
t=z
fγ1 (x) fγ(e)1
(y) fγ
e
(2)
i
,Ξ
(z)
(60)
× fγli,Ξ (t) dxdydzdt,
I4 =
∫ ∞
x=γth
∫ γth
z=0
∫ γth
y=z
∫ ∞
t=z
fγ1 (x) fγ(e)1
(y) fγ
e
(2)
i
,Ξ
(z)
(61)
× fγli,Ξ (t) dxdydzdt,
I5 =
∫ γth
y=0
∫ ∞
x=γth
∫ x
z=γth
∫ ∞
t=z
fγ1 (x) fγ(e)1
(y) fγ
e
(2)
i
,Ξ
(z)
(62)
× f
γ
(li)
2,Ξ
(t) dxdydzdt,
Fig. 9: Comparison of the IP of both scenarios: With and
without ZF.
Fig. 10: IP with ZF precoding vs µ1.
I6=
∫ ∞
x=γth
∫ x
y=γth
∫ γth
z=0
∫ ∞
t=z
fγ1 (x) fγ(e)1
(y) fγ
e
(2)
i
,Ξ
(z)
× fγli,Ξ (t) dxdydzdt. (63)
By applying an integration by parts on (5∀) and (6′) with
u′(y) = f
γ
(e)
1
(y) , and on (6∈) with u′(x) = fγ1 (x) alongside
with some algebraic manipulations, one obtains
I1 =
∫ ∞
y=γth
fγ1 (y)Fγ(e)1
(y) dy
∫ y
z=γth
fγ
e
(2)
i
,Ξ
(z)F cγli,Ξ
(z) dz
−
∫ ∞
y=γth
F cγ1 (y) fγe(2)
i
,Ξ
(y)F cγli,Ξ
(y)F
γ
(e)
1
(y) dy. (64)
I3 = F cγ1 (γth)
∫ γth
y=0
F
γ
(e)
1
(y) fγ
e
(2)
i
,Ξ
(y)F cγli,Ξ
(y) dy. (65)
I5 = Fγ(e)1 (γth)

∫∞
z=γth
fγ
e
(2)
i
,Ξ
(z)F cγ2 (z) dz
− ∫∞
x=γth
Fγ1 (x) fγ
e
(2)
i
,Ξ
(x)F cγ2 (x) dx

(66)
Additionally, by using the basic definition of the CDF in
terms of the respective PDF, it yields
I2 =
∫ ∞
z=γth
F cγ1 (z) fγe(2)
i
,Ξ
(z)F cγli,Ξ
(z)F
γ
(e)
1
(z) dz
− F
γ
(e)
1
(γth)
∫ ∞
z=γth
F cγ1 (z) fγe(2)
i
,Ξ
(z)F cγli,Ξ
(z) dz.
(67)
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I4 = F cγ1 (γth)Fγ(e)1 (γth)
∫ γth
z=0
fγ
e
(2)
i
,Ξ
(z)F cγli,Ξ
(z) dz
− F cγ1 (γth)
∫ γth
z=0
fγ
e
(2)
i
,Ξ
(z)F cγli,Ξ
(z)F
γ
(e)
1
(z) dz. (68)
I6 =
[∫ ∞
x=γth
fγ1 (x)Fγ(e)1
(x) dx
] ∫ γth
z=0
fγ
e
(2)
i
,Ξ
(z)F cγli,Ξ
(z) dz
− F cγ1 (γth)Fγ(e)1 (γth)
∫ γth
z=0
fγ
e
(2)
i
,Ξ
(z)F cγli,Ξ
(z) dz.
(69)
By summing the terms I3, I4, and I6, one obtains
I3 + I4 + I6 =
[∫ ∞
x=γth
fγ1 (x)Fγ(e)1
(x) dx
]
×
[∫ γth
z=0
fγ
e
(2)
i
,Ξ
(z)F cγli,Ξ
(z) dz
]
. (70)
In a similar manner, summing the terms I1, I2, and I5 gives
the following
I1 + I2 + I5 =
∫ ∞
y=γth
fγ1 (y)Fγ(e)1
(y) dy
∫ y
z=γth
fγ
e
(2)
i
,Ξ
× F cγli,Ξ (z) dz. (71)
Thus, by summing the abovementioned two formulas, (30)
is achieved.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF LEMMA 2
A. ZF Case
By involving (18) and (19) alongside with [31, Eq.
(8.356.3)] and [38, Eq. (06.06.20.0003.01)] into JZF (y) in
Lemma 1, one obtains
JZF (y) = Fγ
e
(2)
i
,ZF
(y)−
m
(li)
s −1∑
n1=0
m
(e(2)i )
s −1∑
n2=0
Ui (n1, n2)
n1!
×
(
Y(ZF )
e
(2)
i
)n2+1 ∫ y
0
zn2γinc
(
n1 + 1,Y(ZF )li z
)
exp
(Y(ZF )
e
(2)
i
z
ψi−θiz
)
(ψi − θiz)n2+2
dz.
(72)
with Y(Ξ)κi = vκi
γ
(κi)
Ξ
. By using the lower-incomplete Gamma
sum representation in [31, Eq. (8.352.1)] alongside with some
algebraic manipulations, it yields
JZF (y) =
m
(li)
s −1∑
n1=0
m
(e(2)i )
s −1∑
n2=0
Ui (n1, n2)(
Y(ZF )
e
(2)
i
)−n2−1 n1∑
k1=0
(
Y(ZF )li
)k1
k1!
×
∫ y
0
zn2+k1 exp
[
−
(
1
Y(ZF )
e
(2)
i
(ψi−θiz)
+ Y(ZF )li
)
z
]
(ψi − θiz)n2+2
dz.
(73)
Based on the change of variable w = zψi−θiz +
1
θi
, we have
the following
JZF (y) =
exp
(
Y(ZF )
e
(2)
i
θ−1i
)
ψi
m
(li)
s −1∑
n1=0
m
(e(2)i )
s −1∑
n2=0
Ui (n1, n2)(
Y(ZF )
e
(2)
i
)−n2−1
×
n1∑
k1=0
(−1)k1
k1!
∞∑
j=0
(
ψiY(ZF )li
)j+k1
j!
k1+n2+j∑
p=0
(
k1 + n2 + j
p
)
× (−θi)p−n2
∫ y
ψi−θiy+
1
θi
1
θi
w−k1−j+p exp
(
−Y(ZF )
e
(2)
i
w
)
dw.
(74)
Finally, using the upper-incomplete Gamma function defi-
nition in [31, Eq. (8.350.2)], (31) is attained.
B. Non-ZF Case
By incorporating the CDF and PDF expressions from
(21) jointly with [31, Eq. (8.356.3)] and [38, Eq.
(06.06.20.0003.01)] into JNZF (y) in Lemma 1, one obtains
JNZF (y) = Fγ
e
(2)
i
,NZF
(y)−Ψ
(
e
(2)
i
) m(li)s −1∑
n1=0
m
(e(2)i )
s −1∑
n2=0
Ui (n1, n2)(
Y(NZF )
e
(2)
i
)−n2−1
×
∫ y
z=0
zn2 exp
− Y(ZF )e(2)i z(
Ψ(e
(2)
i )−Θ(e
(2)
i )z
)

(
Ψ
(
e
(2)
i
)
−Θ
(
e
(2)
i
)
z
)n2+2
× γinc
(
n1 + 1,
Y(NZF )li z
Ψ(li) −Θ(li)z
)
dz. (75)
By transforming the lower-incomplete Gamma function in
(18) to an upper incomplete one alongside with the finite sum
expression of the upper-incomplete Gamma function [31, Eq.
(8.352.2)], one can see that
JNZF (y) = Fγ
e
(2)
i
,NZF
(y)− Fγ
e
(2)
i
,NZF
(y) + Ψ
(
e
(2)
i
)
×
m
(li)
s −1∑
n1=0
m
(e(2)i )
s −1∑
n2=0
Ui (n1, n2)(
Y(NZF )
e
(2)
i
)−n2−1 n1∑
k1=0
(
Y(NZF )li
)k1
k1!
×
∫ y
z=0
exp
[
−z
(
Y(NZF )li
Ψ(li)−Θ(li)z +
Y(NZF )
e
(2)
i
Ψ(e
(2)
i )−Θ(e
(2)
i )z
)]
(
Ψ
(
e
(2)
i
)
−Θ
(
e
(2)
i
)
z
)n2+2
× z
n2+k1(
Ψ(li) −Θ(li)z)k1 dz. (76)
At this level, two subcases for the result are distinguished,
namely L
(
e
(2)
i
)
> L(li), and L
(
e
(2)
i
)
< L(li).
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By making use of the change of variable w =
Ψ(li)Ti
Ψ(li)−Θ(li)z + Ψ
(li)Θ
(
e
(2)
i
)
, if L
(
e
(2)
i
)
> L(li)
− Ψ(e
(2)
i )Ti
Ψ(e
(2)
i )−Θ(e
(2)
i )z
+ Θ(li)Ψ
(
e
(2)
i
)
, if L
(
e
(2)
i
)
< L(li)
alongside with [31, Eq. (1.211.1)] and the binomial theorem,
yields (77) at the top of the next page. Finally, by using [31,
Eq. (8.350.2)], JNZF (y) in (32) is attained.
Remark 2. For the first study subcase (i.e., L
(
e
(2)
i
)
> L(li)),
and from the integral definition JΞ(y) in Lemma 1, we have
the following
JNZF
(
L
(
e
(2)
i
))
=
∫ L(li)
0
fγ
e
(2)
i
,NZF
(z)
(
1− Fγ
e
(2)
i
,NZF
(z)
)
dz
+
∫ L(e(2)i )
L(li)
fγ
e
(2)
i
,NZF
(z)F cγli,NZF
(y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
dz
= JNZF
(
L(li)
)
. (78)
Thus, when evaluating JNZF (.) for y = L
(
e
(2)
i
)
when
L
(
e
(2)
i
)
> L(li), it should be evaluated at L(li) within the
final result in (32) for the non-ZF case.
VII. APPENDIX D: PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Relying on integration by parts in (33), the integral K (ϕ)
can be expressed as
K (ϕ) = 1−
[
Fγ1 (y)Fγ(e)1
(y)
]∞
ϕ
−H1 +H2 (ϕ) . (79)
with H1 =
∫∞
y=0
Fγ1 (y) fγ(e)1
(y) dy and H2 (ϕ) =∫ ϕ
y=0
Fγ1 (y) fγ(e)1
(y) dy. Involving the CDF and PDF expres-
sions in (13) with parameters r = 1, αe, βe, ξ2e , and µe, and
(15) into the abovementioned equations, and making use of the
Mellin transform [32, Eq. (2.9)], the integral H1 is computed
as
H1 = PePK1
∑
h1+h2+h3=K
∞∑
l=0
Fh1,h2,h3,l
× Γ (αe + %l,h1,h2,h3) Γ (βe + %l,h1,h2,h3)
Υ
%l,h1,h2,h3
e (ξ2e + %l,h1,h2,h3)
. (80)
Furthermore, by using [38, Eq. (06.10.02.0001.01)], the
above equation reduces to (34). Again, by using [38, Eq.
(07.34.21.0003.01)] in H2 (ϕ), (35) is attained.
VIII. APPENDIX E: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
A. ZF Case
By using Lemma 1 result as well as the PDF and CDF
expressions of γ
e
(2)
i ,ZF
and γli,ZF in (18) and (19), we
distinguish two cases, namely Li < γth < y and Li > γth.
• First case (Li < γth): as the PDF fγ
e
(2)
i
,ZF
(z) = 0 for
z > Li, the integral in (30) becomes
I =
[∫ ∞
y=γth
fγ1 (y)Fγ(e)1
(y) dy
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
K(γth)
[∫ Li
z=0
fγ
e
(2)
i
,ZF
(z)F cγli,ZF
(z) dz
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
JZF (Li)
,
(81)
for Li < γth. Thus, using Lemma 2 result for y = Li
as well as Lemma 3 result with ϕ = γth and involving
it into (81), one obtains
P
(i)
int,ZF = 1−K (γth)JZF (Li) ;Li < γth, (82)
• Second case (Li ≥ γth): in such an instance, two sub-
cases are distinguished, namely Li ≥ y ≥ γth and y >
Li ≥ γth. Hence, the integral (30) becomes
I =
∫ Li
y=γth
fγ1 (y)Fγ(e)1
(y)
∫ y
z=0
fγ
e
(2)
i
,ZF
(z)F cγli,ZF
(z) dzdy︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(i)
+
[∫ ∞
y=Li
fγ1 (y)Fγ(e)1
(y) dy
] [∫ Li
z=0
fγ
e
(2)
i
,ZF
(z)F cγli,ZF
(z) dz
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
N (i)
.
(83)
Interestingly, the integrals of the second term N (i) can be
computed readily from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, with y = Li
and ϕ = Li, respectively. On the other hand, by involving
Lemma 2 result in (31) as well as the derivative of (15) and
(13) with ($ = e, r = 1) into O(i), it produces the following
O(i) =
∫ Li
y=γth
fγ1 (y)Fγ(e)1
(y)J (y)dy
= O(i)1 −O (Li) . (84)
with O(i)1 and O (Li) given in (85) and (86) at the top of the
next page, respectively.
Note that O (Li)equals O(i)2 or O(i)3 given in (39) for γth ≤
Li < 2γth and Li > 2γth, respectively.
One can notice evidently that (38) yields from (13), (15),
(31), as well as (33) and (85). On the other hand, the Meijer’s
G-function in (86) can be expressed using residues theorem
as [39, Theorem 1.2]
G3,12,4
(
Υey
∣∣∣∣ 1; ξ2e + 1ξ2e , αe, βe; 0
)
= b
(0)
ξ2e
(Υey)
ξ2e +
∞∑
v=0
b(v)αe (Υey)
αe+v
+
∞∑
v=0
b
(v)
βe
(Υey)
βe+v . (87)
under the assumption: xi − xj /∈ Z, i 6= j, with xi being
defined in Proposition 1.
• Thus, incorporating the above residues expansion into
(86), making use of the Meijer’s G representation of
Γ (., .) given in [38, Eq. (06.06.26.0005.01)] as well
as performing a change of variable yψi−θiy +
1
θi
= t
14
JNZF (y) =
m
(li)
s −1∑
n1=0
m
(e(2)i )
s −1∑
n2=0
Ui (n1, n2)
exp
(
−G
(
li,e
(2)
i
)) n1∑
k1=0
(
Y(NZF )li Ψ
(e(2)i )
Ti
)k1
k1!
∞∑
j=0
(−1)j
j!
(
−Θ(li)Ψ
(
e
(2)
i
)
G
(
e
(2)
i ,li
))j+n2+1
×
n2+k1+j∑
p=0
(−1)p+1(
Θ(li)Ψ
(
e
(2)
i
))p(n2 + k1 + jp
)∫ TiΨ(li)
Ψ(li)−Θ(li)y
+Θ(e
(2)
i )Ψ(li)
w=Θ(li)Ψ(e
(2)
i )
wp−n2−2−j
exp
(
r
li
1 w
Ti
)dw. (77)
O(i)1 =
PePK1 Y(ZF )e(2)i
exp
(
−r
(
e
(2)
i
)
1
) m(li)s −1∑
n1=0
m
(e(2)i )
s −1∑
n2=0
Ui (n1, n2)
n1∑
k1=0
∞∑
j=0
(−1)j
k1!j!
(
r
(li)
1 ψi
)j+k1 h1+n2+j∑
p=0
(
h1+n2+j
p
)(
−r
(
e
(2)
i
)
1
)p−h1−j−n2
× Γ
(
−k1 − j + p+ 1, r
(
e
(2)
i
)
1
) ∑
h1+h2+h3=K
∞∑
l=0
Fh1,h2,h3,l%l,h1,h2,h3
∫ Li
y=γth
G3,12,4
(
Υey
∣∣∣∣ 1; ξ2e + 1ξ2e , αe, βe; 0
)
y1−%l,h1,h2,h3
dy, (85)
O (Li) = exp
(
r
(
e
(2)
i
)
1
)
PePK1
∑
h1+h2+h3=K
∞∑
l=0
Fh1,h2,h3,l%l,h1,h2,h3
m
(li)
s −1∑
n1=0
m
(e(2)i )
s −1∑
n2=0
Ui (n1, n2)
×
n1∑
h1=0
∞∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
−r(li)1 ψi
)j
k1!j!
h1+n2+j∑
p=0
(
h1 + n2 + j
p
)(
−r
(
e
(2)
i
)
1
)h1+j−p+n2
×
∫ Li
y=γth
y%l,h1,h2,h3−1G3,12,4
(
Υey
∣∣∣∣ 1; ξ2e + 1ξ2e , αe, βe; 0
)
Γ
(
−h1 − j + p+ 1,Y(ZF )
e
(2)
i
(
y
ψi − θiy +
1
θi
))
dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
B(1,i)
. (86)
produces: B(1,i) = B(1,i)ξ2e + B
(1,i)
αe + B(1,i)βe , where B
(1,i)
x
is defined in (40) for γth < Li ≤ 2γth, with
Si (y, v) = Li
θi
b(v)y Υ
y
e
∫ ∞
t=
γth
ψi−θiγth+
1
θi
t−g(y,0,v)
×
G2,01,2
(
Y(ZF )
e
(2)
i
t
∣∣∣∣ −; 10,−k1 − j + p+ 1;−
)
(
Li
(
t− 1θi
))2−g(y,0,v) dt.
(88)
Again, using the Meijer’s G-function definition in [38,
Eq. (07.34.02.0001.01)] as well as [31, Eq. (3.194.2)]
and through some algebraic manipulations, one obtains:
Si (y, v) = L g(y,0,v)−1i Υye
b
(v)
y
θi
1
2pii
∫
C
(
γth
ψi − θiγth
)−s−1
× Γ (s) Γ (−k1 − j + p+ 1 + s)
Γ (2 + s)
(
Y(ZF )
e
(2)
i
)−s
× 2F1
(
s+ g (y, 0, v) , 1 + s; 2 + s, 1− Li
γth
)
ds.
(89)
with 2F1 (., ., .; .) denotes the Gauss hypergeometric
function [38, Eqs. (07.23.02.0001.01, 07.23.02.0004.01)].
These last mentioned identities define this func-
tion when the absolute value of the argument 1 −
Li
γth
is either less or greater than 1. For the for-
mer case (i.e., γth < Li ≤ 2γth) , using the func-
tion definition using eq. (07.23.02.0001.01) of [38],
and based on the Pochhammer symbol simplifica-
tion [38, Eq. (06.10.02.0001.01)] as well as [38, Eq.
(07.34.02.0001.01)] , Si (y, v) given for the first case of
(40) (i.e., m = 1) is attained.
Importantly, when
(
i.e., Liγth > 2
)
, and using
the second definition of 2F1 (., ., .; z) , z > 1
[38, Eq. (07.23.02.0004.01)] alongside with eqs.
(06.10.02.0001.01, 07.34.02.0001.01) of [38] and some
algebraic manipulation, Si (y, v) in (89) is substituted by
the notation Ri (y, v), where the resulting expression of
Ri (y, v) are obtained for the second case of (40) (i.e.,
m = 2).
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B. Non ZF Case
By using Lemma 1 result alongside with the PDF/CDF of
γ
e
(2)
i ,NZF
and γli,NZF in (21), we consider only the case
when L
(
e
(2)
i
)
< γth < y . As the PDF fγ(i)E2,NZF
(z) = 0 for
z ≥ L
(
e
(2)
i
)
, the integral definition of JNZF (y) in Lemma 1
is positive only for z < L
(
e
(2)
i
)
. Thus, in such an instance,
the integral in (30) becomes
I =
[∫ ∞
y=γth
fγ1 (y)Fγ(e)1
(y) dy
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
K(γth)
×
∫ L(e(2)i )
z=0
fγ
e
(2)
i
,NZF
(z)F cγli,NZF
(z) dz

︸ ︷︷ ︸
JNZF
(
L(e
(2)
i )
)
;L
(
e
(2)
i
)
< γth.
(90)
Hence, using Lemma 2 result for y = L
(
e
(2)
i
)
and Lemma 3
result with ϕ = γth and involving it into (81), one obtains
(37).
IX. APPENDIX F: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
From (30), the systems IP can be expressed at high SNR
(i.e., γ(li)Ξ , µ1 →∞, γ(li)Ξ = (i)Ξ µ1, (i)Ξ > 0) as
P
(i,∞)
int,Ξ ' 1−
∫ ∞
y=γth
f∞γ1 (y)Fγ(e)1
(y) dy
∫ y
z=0
fγ
e
(2)
i
,Ξ
(z)
×
(
1− F∞γli,Ξ (z)
)
dz. (91)
As µ1 →∞, Υ→ 0 as can be seen after (15), which yields
that ∆i given in (52) will be asymptotically represented by
considering only least powers of Υ in Ei’s expression given
right after (52), corresponding to l = 0. Therefore
∆
(∞)
i ∼ a(i)0 (Υz)xi , (92)
with xi denotes ξ21 , α1, and β1, for i = 1, 2, and 3, respec-
tively. Consequently, the CDF Fγ1(z) (15) can be asymptoti-
cally approximated using (51) as
F∞γ1 (z) ∼
(
a
(d)
0 (Υz)
xd P1
)K
, (93)
with xd = min
i=1,2,3
(xi).
On the other hand, by using the lower-incomplete Gamma
expansion [38, Eq. (06.06.06.0001.02)] in (21) and (18), taking
only the least powers of 1
γ
(li)
Ξ
(i.e., n1 = 0), one obtains
F∞γli,ZF (z) '
λlivliz
γ
(li)
ZF
, (94)
F∞γli,NZF (z) '
λlivliz
γ
(li)
NZF
(
Ψ(li) −Θ(li)z) . (95)
A. ZF case
1) First Case: γth > Li
In this case, by making use of integration by parts, (91) is
expressed as
P
(i,∞)
int,ZF = 1−
(∫ ∞
y=γth
f∞γ1 (y)Fγ(e)1
(y) dy
)
×
(
1−
∫ Li
z=0
fγ
e
(2)
i
,ZF
(z)F∞γli,ZF (z) dz
)
(96)
= F∞γ1 (γth)Fγ(e)1
(γth) +
∫ ∞
y=γth
F∞γ1 (y) fγ(e)1
(y) dy
+
∫ Li
z=0
fγ
e
(2)
i
,ZF
(z)F∞γli,ZF (z) dz
−
(
F∞γ1 (γth)Fγ(e)1
(γth) +
∫ ∞
y=γth
F∞γ1 (y) fγ(e)1
(y) dy
)
×
∫ Li
z=0
fγ
e
(2)
i
,ZF
(z)F∞γli,ZF (z) dz. (97)
By involving (93) and (94) into (97), it can be seen that
the diversity order of the first two terms above is Gd = Kxd,
Gd = 1 for the third term, and Gd = Kxd + 1 for the fourth
one. Therefore, the IP will be expanded by either the first two
terms if Kxd < 1, or the third term when Kxd > 1. Hence,
the IP is expressed as
P
(i,∞)
int,ZF ' Gc,ZF
(
γ
(li)
ZF
)−Gd
, γth > Li, (98)
with Gc,ZF and Gd are given in Proposition 3, where
Q(i,Ξ) = γ(li)Ξ
∫ ρ
z=0
fγ
e
(2)
i
,Ξ
(z)F∞γli,Ξ (z) dz, with ρ equals Li
or L
(
e
(2)
i
)
for ZF and NZF scenarios, respectively.
X (ϕ) =
(
γ
(li)
Ξ

(i)
Ξ
)Kxd ∫ ∞
y=ϕ
F∞γ1 (y) fγ(e)1
(y) dy
=
ξ2e
Γ (αe) Γ (βe)
a(d)0 ξ21
(

(i)
Ξ Υ
′
)xd
Γ (α1) Γ (β1)
K
×

∫∞
y=0
zKxd−1G3,01,3
(
Υez
∣∣∣∣ −; ξ2e + 1ξ2e , αe, βe;−
)
− ∫ ϕ
y=0
zKxd−1G3,01,3
(
Υez
∣∣∣∣ −; ξ2e + 1ξ2e , αe, βe;−
)
 .
(99)
By using the Mellin transform [32, Eq. (2.9)] and the
identity [38, Eq. (07.34.21.0003.01)] for X (ϕ), respectively,
alongside with some manipulations, one obtains (47). On the
other hand, by plugging (94) and (19) into Q(i,ZF ) and by
using a change of variable t = ψiψi−θiz with [31, Eq. (8.350.2)],
(48) is reached.
2) Second Case: γth < Li
Likewise, using integration by parts, the IP in (91) is
expressed at high SNR when γth < Li as given in (100)
at the top of the next page,
where in a similar way, it can be seen that the IP is expanded
as given in (44), (45) and (46) for Ξ = ZF.
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P
(i,∞)
int,ZF = 1−
∫ Li
y=γth
f∞γ1 (y)Fγ(e)1
(y) dy
∫ y
z=0
fγ
e
(2)
i
,ZF
(z)F c,∞γli,ZF (z) dz
−
∫ ∞
y=Li
f∞γ1 (y)Fγ(e)1
(y) dy
∫ Li
z=0
fγ
e
(2)
i
,ZF
(z)F c,∞γli,ZF (z) dz
= F∞γ1 (Li)Fγ(e)1
(Li)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gd=Kxd
+
∫ ∞
y=Li
F∞γ1 (y) fγ(e)1
(y) dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gd=Kxd
+
∫ Li
z=0
fγ
e
(2)
i
,ZF
(z)F∞γli,ZF (z) dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gd=1
−
(
F∞γ1 (Li)Fγ(e)1
(Li) +
∫ ∞
y=Li
F∞γ1 (y) fγ(e)1
(y) dy
)∫ Li
z=0
fγ
e
(2)
i
,ZF
(z)F∞γli,ZF (z) dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gd=Kxd+1
−
∫ Li
y=γth
f∞γ1 (y)Fγ(e)1
(y) dy
∫ y
z=0
fγ
e
(2)
i
,ZF
(z)F c,∞γli,ZF (z) dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gd=Kxd+1
. (100)
B. Non-ZF case
In a similar manner to the ZF case, the IP can be
expanded as given in (97) by replacing Li by L
(
e
(2)
i
)
as P (i,∞)int,NZF ' Gc,NZF
(
γ
(li)
NZF
)−Gd
for γth > L
(
e
(2)
i
)
,
with Gc,NZF and Gd are defined in Proposition 3. By
involving (95) and (21) into Q(i,NZF ) defined in the
previous subsection, it yields (101) at the top of the
next page. Finally, by using the change of variable x =
(
TiΨ(li)
Ψ(li)−Θ(li)z + Θ
(
e
(2)
i
)
Ψ(li)
)−1
, L
(
e
(2)
i
)
> L(li)(
− TiΨ(e
(2)
i )
Ψ(e
(2)
i )−Θ(e
(2)
i )z
+ Θ(li)Ψ
(
e
(2)
i
))−1
, L
(
e
(2)
i
)
< L(li)
with the binomial theorem alongside with [31, Eqs. (3.352.1),
(3.381.1)] for L
(
e
(2)
i
)
> L(li), and [31, Eq. (3.383.4)], [38, Eq.
(07.45.26.0005.01, 07.34.16.0001.01)] for L
(
e
(2)
i
)
< L(li),
and performing some algebraic manipulations, one obtains
(49) given in the proposition.
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